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#.  This note aims to provide a theoretical framework to think of the youth 
unemployment problem and a classification of EU countries according to the way they address it. 
The key factor to explain youth unemployment is what we call the youth experience gap. To help 
young people fill it in and ease school-to-work transitions, every EU country provides a mix of 
policy instruments, including different degrees and types of labour market flexibility, of educational 
and training systems, of passive income support schemes and fiscal incentives. Five different 
country groups are detected whose outcomes in terms of youth unemployment are dramatically 
different: a) the North-European; b) the Continental European; c) the Anglo-Saxon; d) the South-
European; e) New Member States. The Lisbon strategy provides guidelines in line with the 
theoretical framework discussed here, but it is costly and hard to implement. 
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  1Introduction 
 
According to Quintini, Martin and Martin (2007), the average OECD ratio of the youth 
to the adult unemployment rate amounted to about 2.4 in 1995 and increased to about 2.7 
in 2005. Over the same period of time, the average OECD youth unemployment rate has 
remained stable at slightly more than 15%, suggesting that young people were unable to 
improve their position in a period of increasing, though moderately increasing, prosperity 
in the area.  
The EU youth unemployment rate is on average about two times higher than that of 
adults and, therefore lower than the OECD average. Nonetheless, due to the large 
differences existing across European countries, including the New Member States, this 
represents in some countries a priority in the political agenda of the EU and several 
national governments. In most part of South European countries and new member states, 
the ratio of the youth to adult unemployment rate is generally higher than the EU average.  
This note is a first contribution to highlight the mechanisms behind school-to-work 
transitions. Its aims are three-fold: to provide a short and up-to-date overview of the issue, 
to propose a theoretical framework to interpret country differences and to elaborate some 
policy suggestions. The main argument of the paper is that cross-country differences 
depend on the way different welfare system mixes seek to fill the youth experience gap. 
We start from a number of clarifications. First, when analysing young people behaviour 
in the labour market, it is misleading to think in terms of employment rates, because 
employment is not necessarily the best option for young people, especially the young 
teenagers (14-19). Looking at employment rates is interesting only for young adults (20-24) 
and the oldest youth age group (29-34). The best option for young teenagers is education 
and/or training. In recent years, also for young adults there is often a trade-off between 
employment, which is an objective in the short-term, and increasing investment in 
education and work experience. 
Second, macroeoconomic scenarios alone fail to catch the permanent nature of the 
youth unemployment problem which can be only understood looking at the specific 
weakness of young people participation to the labour market, namely the youth experience 
gap, and the way different education, training and welfare systems affect it. 
When attempting to reduce the youth experience gap, which is the main cause of the 
high youth unemployment rate, the three factors of policy intervention to consider include 
not only the degree of labour market flexibility, but also: a) educational systems; b) school-
to-work transitions and all the factors that affect the intensity of job search, training, 
passive income support; c) spells and length of unemployment; d) quality of employment.  
Different welfare systems can make school-to-work transitions smooth contributing to 
reduce youth unemployment. Under this respect, at least five different systems can be 
identified in Europe: a) the North-European; b) the Continental European; c) the Anglo-
Saxon; d) the South-European; e) that of new member states. At this stage, it is still 
difficult to say whether the New Member States belong to a specific fifth group or rather to 
one of the existing EU groups. The common heritage of socialist countries would suggest 
considering them an independent group, but a number of cross-country differences do not 
allow disentangling clearly the specificity of such group. Moreover, many changes are still 
on-going and the final outcomes are not clear yet. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. We start from some stylised facts. We then set 
the theoretical framework of the analysis starting from what we call the mainstream 
approach to filling the youth experience gap. In what follows we raise a number of critiques 
to the mainstream approach, concluding that every EU country addresses, in fact, the 
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brings to the fore our classification of European welfare systems and discusses differences 
among them. Some final remarks conclude. 
 
 
1. The youth experience gap 
As Clark and Summers (1982) noted in a seminal paper, the flows in and out of 
unemployment are higher for young compared to adult people because: a) young people 
are in search for their best job match; b) and often they go back to education and training 
after an employment or unemployment spell; c) this is especially true for low skill young 
people; d) employers are also in search for the best job match.  
The consequences are: short average unemployment duration compared to adults, but a 
higher average risk of falling into a chain of low pay, temporary or part-time work. These 
two outcomes seem to be inconsistent with each other, but, in fact, they are not. To 
reconcile them with each other one should keep in mind that there are two different paths 
for high and low skill young people. The latter might start with unemployment spells early 
in their life, which leads them to experience long unemployment spells also in the rest of 
their lives. 
The main reason why young people are always moving among different labour market 
statuses is that they have a lower level of human capital and therefore of productivity 
compared to their adult counterparts, which ceteris paribus makes employers prefer adult 
people to them. Despite ever increasing educational attainment, in fact, young people lack 
the other two components of human capital, namely generic and job-specific work 
experience. It is in fact with the aim to fill what one could call the “youth experience gap” 
that they move in and out of employment in search for the best job-worker match.  
 
2. The mainstream approach to the causes of youth unemployment 
The mainstream approach to the youth employment (or unemployment) problem is 
optimistic as to the solutions to it and leads to the conclusion that it is not, in fact, a really 
dramatic problem. Youth unemployment is in principle temporary, provided that young 
people manage sooner or later to fill their “experience gap”. In most cases, the market itself 
is able to solve the problem in the long run, at least at an individual level. This is why, in 
fact, the unemployment rate reduces with age. Then, why to bother about youth 
unemployment?  High youth unemployment is the consequence of young people and 
employers search for the best job match.  
According to the mainstream approach to youth unemployment, the best option for 
policy makers wishing to reduce youth unemployment is to minimise the effort of young 
people in filling their gap of work experience. Every country should make the market more 
flexible to increase the chances of young people to find a good job and gain work 
experience. 
Within this framework, what the policy maker should do is increasing the probability for 
a young person to find a job, once (s)he has become unemployed. This conclusion is based 
on the hypothesis of negative duration dependence of the job finding rate, based on early 
survival analysis studies: such studies found that the higher is the length of an 
unemployment spell, the lower is the probability of becoming employed. Two main factors 
could explain this outcome in turn: from the supply side, unemployment causes a process 
of deskilling of those who experience it; from the demand side, employers prefer those 
with shorter unemployment spells, because they take this as a signal of high motivation to 
work. An important point of this reasoning is that once entering the labour market, 
  3transitions among labour market statuses follow a Markov process and therefore the 
probability of job finding is initially even across individuals independent of their skills. 
However, once an individual has become unemployed his probability to remain 
unemployed increases, while that of job finding reduces, generating duration dependence 
of the job finding rate. In other words, almost by chance some individuals rather than 
others fall into unemployment traps. 
An important implication of this approach is that youth unemployment must be higher 
the lower is the degree of labour turnover in a country’s labour market. As an example 
compare two extreme cases of rigid and flexible labour market, namely Italy and the USA. 
In Italy, in the early 1990s, the job finding rate was about 13%, which means that 13 out of 
100 unemployed found a job after a year of their unemployment spell. On average an 
unemployment spell has the probability to last just less than 5 years. In the USA, the 
comparable figure is over 50% and every unemployed has an average chance to find a job 
in less than 2 years. The higher youth unemployment rate must be an obvious consequence 
of differences in the degree of labour market flexibility. In the case of Italy, over the 1990s 
and in the 2000s, the Treu and the ensuing laws have slightly increased the degree of labour 
turnover. The job finding rate was slightly over 20% in 2003, which has been accompanied 
by slightly reduced youth unemployment. 
In this framework, labour market flexibility has another important implication. Not only 
it reduces the length of unemployment spells and hence the share of long-term 
unemployment, it also reduces the youth experience gap. The market, in fact, will provide 
training to young people using temporary work. The advantages of temporary work can be 
summarised as follows: a) it is a stepping-stone for young people to find their best match; 
b) employers pay low wages for low productivity; c) employers have the opportunity to 
“try” young people; d) special intervention – including passive income-support and pro-
active schemes – is needed only for particularly weak young people; e) demand side factors 
are not more important than the way of working of the labour market. 
Another important policy implication of the liberalist view on which the mainstream 
approach is based is that the policy maker should contrast wage-setting mechanisms at a 
national level, since they equalise wages across age groups. In turn, equal pay for different 
human capital and skill levels are an important factor of youth unemployment. Lower entry 
wages for lower productivity would be the solution to the lower degree of work experience 
of young people. 
A recent example of this economic policy strategy is the OECD (1994) job study. Many 
consider this influential report the “ideological” source and the beginning of a period of 
increasing labour market flexibility in Europe and also worldwide. One way has consisted 
of removing the obstacles to the adoption by employers of temporary work arrangements, 
therefore reducing hiring and firing costs for firms wishing to hire young people. In the 
mean time, temporary work is an indirect way to introduce lower entry wages for young 
people. 
 
3. Weaknesses of the mainstream approach 
There are two formidable arguments against the use of labour market flexibility and 
temporary work as the solution to the youth experience gap. The available empirical 
evidence and applied research on the impact of temporary work on youth labour market 
outcomes seems to confirm caveats based on theoretical reasoning. 
 
  43.1 The argument against negative duration dependence 
As already noted, according to the mainstream approach, a sufficiently high degree of 
labour market flexibility, implemented, for instance, via the use of fixed-term contracts, is 
the best means to help young people to find their best match in a shorter time, therefore 
reducing the gap between youth and adult unemployment rates. This view was also based 
on the hypothesis that long-term unemployment is generally caused by low labour turnover 
causing in turn state dependence. Therefore, the longer people stay unemployed, the longer 
they remain unemployed.  
According to Heckman and Borjas (1980) and Heckman and Singer (1984), however, 
this view is not supported by empirical evidence. Once controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity, duration dependence in unemployment disappears. More specifically, the 
probability to find a job at a given time is not any more negatively related in a statistically 
significant way to the duration of the unemployment spell, but becomes flat. Therefore, 
long-term unemployment appears to be the consequence of the low motivation and skills 
of the unemployed rather than of the time spent in unemployment itself. 
Recall the example of Italy versus USA. Also in the USA, where the labour market if 
highly flexible there might be negative duration dependence of the job finding rate, simply 
due to the low motivation and unobserved skills of some unemployed. They will not find a 
job, although job opportunities are more frequent. In other words, increasing labour 
market flexibility does have an impact, but only on those unemployed who are more 
motivated, not on every unemployed. The reason is that also for the new labour market 
entrants, the chances of job finding are unevenly distributed. Many factors might explain 
why ceteris paribus some young people have higher chances than others also controlling 
for educational levels: individuals with the same educational level might differ for the 
quality of their education; the greater social capital; the informal networks of their 
households; the availability of their own business and so on. 
This innovative approach to the causes of long-term unemployment calls also for a 
different approach to the economic policy to fight it. If the high unemployment rate of 
some young people is the consequence of low motivation and skills, rather than of low job 
opportunities, then, reducing the degree of employment protection might increase the 
chances to find a job only of some of the unemployed young people, not of all of them. 
The least motivated and skilled individuals would not benefit from greater labour turnover. 
They should instead be helped by employment policy in general and active labour market 
programmes.  
 
3.2. The Becker’s argument of market failure for job specific training 
Fixed-term contracts might be seen as a solution only to reduce the gap in generic, but 
not in job specific work experience. In fact, the short time horizon of fixed-term contracts 
may represent a strong disincentive (as already Becker, 1962, noted) for young people to 
invest in job specific competences for both the employer and the employee. Lower wage 
costs, which are attached to fixed-term contracts, might not be themselves a sufficient 
incentive to overcome the “youth experience gap” and therefore to provide sufficient 
incentives for employers to hire young people later.  
The Nobel Prize winner, Gary Becker, had already pointed to the need to invest in job 
specific work experience as the reason of the worldwide diffusion of life-long jobs. Formal 
training is necessary in this context to raise employability more than lower wages or short-
term employment experiences. 
 
3.3. Temporary work: Stepping stone or a dead-end job? 
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always seen as an achievement, but rather as a further cause of distress for young people. 
As the recent experience of several old EU member states shows, temporary work often 
becomes a low-pay trap. In other words, some young people tend to accept low pay jobs 
and instead of accumulating work experience to find later high pay, high quality jobs, they 
remain trapped for many years or also for the rest of their lives. This has lead a number of 
researchers in Europe to ask whether fixed-term contracts should be considered stepping 
stone or dead-end jobs. 
Rigorous empirical research has shown that too often temporary work causes 
precariousness of labour market experiences (see, among others, Booth, Francesconi and 
Frank, 2002; Güell and Petrongolo, 2007; and the references therein). Using a 
macroeconomic model, Staffolani and Nunziata (2007) recently find that fixed-term 
contracts have worked as stepping stones to permanent employment, whereas flexible 
temporary agency work regulations seem to induce a substitution of permanent with 
temporary contracts in the EU15. 
According to many scholars, the evidence that too many fixed-term contracts are in nuce 
dead-end jobs call for constraints to the free adoption of temporary work. And also the 
OECD has contributed to recently shift the debate from the dualism flexibility/rigidity to 
the definition of the optimal regulation mix to make fixed-term contracts more efficient in 
providing training and job opportunities for young people. 
 
3. Policy mix 
The above arguments suggest that labour market flexibility is more effective in the case 
of more skilled individuals and must be supplemented by pro-active schemes able to reduce 
the youth experience gap for the least skilled young people. 
Taking into account the above two arguments, one should think of the policy to fight 
youth unemployment as a mix of different instruments, which, in turn, depend not only on 
the degree of labour market flexibility, but also on efficient educational, training and, more 
generally, welfare systems and the system of fiscal incentives to hire the weakest groups of 
youth unemployed.  
Theoretical reasoning and the available empirical evidence suggests that educational 
systems differ in their effectiveness to fight youth unemployment on whether they are: 
a)  Rigid versus flexible; 
b)  Sequential versus dual. 
Rigid educational systems discourage movements across curricula and require long 
periods of time to obtain a degree. Sequential educational systems envisage training after 
finishing general education, whereas dual systems envisage that general education and 
professional training (apprenticeship) be contemporary.  
The welfare systems differ according to: 
a)  the relative share of pro-active versus passive income support schemes;  
b)  targeting and scale of expenditure;  
c)  state- versus family-based welfare systems. 
Finally, also the size and types of fiscal incentives to hire young people are important. 
 
4. Different welfare systems 
European countries can be grouped into four different welfare systems: 
1)  North-European; 
2)  Continental European; 
3)  Anglo-Saxon; 
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5)  New Member States 
This classification largely overlaps with that elaborated by Esping-Andersen (1990) for 
old member states. In what follows, we shortly describe the main features of these five 
systems, providing besides the title also the keyword to identify the specificity of each 
system. We also shortly summarise the advantages and disadvantages of each system in 
smoothing school-to-work transitions. For shortness sake, the statistical evidence is 
reduced to a minimum. In fact, several recent papers provide already a vivid, up-to-date 
and very much detailed picture of many dimensions of the youth labour market experience 
(see, among others, Quintini, Martin and Martin, 2007).  
 
4.1. North-European system: Active Labour Market Policy 
Essentially, the North-European group includes the Scandinavian countries. They are a 
quite homogeneous group, though they have shown some different performances in recent 
years. In this group of countries, the youth unemployment rate is relatively low compared 
to the EU and the OECD average, but the youth to adult unemployment rate is relatively 
high, mirroring the low average unemployment rate. Over the 1990s, especially Finland, 
involved in the Russian financial crisis of 1998, has experienced unusually high (youth) 
unemployment rate, but the country has been able in few years to reduce it again roughly to 
the same level of other countries in the area. 
The system of education is flexible and sequential. The degree of the overall labour 
market flexibility is generally low. Job search through employment agencies is frequent. 
The labour force has a high level of unionisation.  
The main feature of this system is perhaps the fact that it relies on a very well developed 
welfare state system. In fact, passive income support schemes are available for the 
unemployed. Recently unemployment benefits are given on a contractual basis and, namely, 
provided based on the obligation to attend training courses. Active labour market policy 
(ALMP) is implemented on a large scale. There is large evidence of a gross impact of 
ALMP on youth employment opportunities for those individuals who attended training 
programmes, though the net impact is a matter of discussion. By net impact of ALMP we 
mean the gross impact minus the number of those who would have obtained a job anyway, 
independent of attendance of training schemes (Sianesi, 2004). 
The profile of youth unemployed in Sweden, a country representative of this group, is 
similar to that of Germany, described in the following sub-section: a) Men with long 
unemployment spells; b) Low social capital: no active participation in social life, no active 
search for a job; c) Relatively old, but with little educational differences; d) Having children 
increases the risk of unemployment; e) Training programmes are massive and participation 
into it has some gross impact on employment opportunities (Caroleo and Pastore, 2003). 
The European Employment Strategy (EES) is already largely in place in as much as 
education, training or job opportunity are offered to each unemployed young people within 
6 months of unemployment spell. Overall, young people experience a high degree of 
employment protection, based on a long tradition of welfare state. 
The disadvantages of this system include low social mobility and the high cost for the 
State budget of the overall system of school-to-work transition. Especially the expenditure 
in ALMP is very high. 
 
4.2. Continental-European: The Dual educational system 
Austria, Denmark, Germany and Switzerland belong to this group. Germany and 
Denmark have always featured the lowest youth-to-adult unemployment rate worldwide: it 
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in Germany the risk of unemployment for young people is roughly the same as that of 
adult people. Despite the German reunification and the high unemployment rate of the 
Eastern länders, still the German youth-to-adult unemployment rate remained below 1.5 in 
2005 (Quintini, Martin and Martin, 2007). 
The main candidate to explain the success of the Continental-European, and especially 
the German model is the specific nature of their educational system and especially the so-
called dual principle. Apprenticeship is perhaps the most important piece of the German 
system. At the end of compulsory schooling, young people are offered the opportunity 
either to attend general high school or to attend vocational school and go into 
apprenticeship programmes. This dramatically reduces the unemployment rate, offering to 
workers not wishing to attend the University after secondary high school a high degree of 
integration in the educational system and, in the meantime, an important training 
opportunity to become a skilled manual worker.  
The weakness of the Continental-European educational system is its rigidity. One 
important element of rigidity of this system is the fact that those who have chosen at a very 
young age to go into vocational education have little chance to change their mind and 
attain higher levels of education later. In fact, it is not allowed to those with a vocational 
high school degree to go on into university. In a period of increasing tertiary education, this 
might represent an important constraint to the development of a skilled workforce in the 
future. For now, however, Germany still scores one of the highest share of young people 
with a tertiary diploma. 
The degree of labour market flexibility is low in Germany, but high in Denmark (so-
called “flexicurity system”). Job search happens through employment agencies. There is a 
high level of unionisation of the labour force. Apprenticeship is provided on a large scale 
for many high school students. Active labour market policy is provided for the weakest 
groups. Passive income support schemes are available for the unemployed. 
The identikit of youth unemployment in Germany is as follows: a) Men with low 
education attainment; b) Little work experience; c) Long unemployment spells; d) Low 
social capital: no active participation in social life; e) Having children increases the risk of 
unemployment; f) Training programmes have no gross impact (Caroleo and Pastore, 2003). 
The advantages of this system are: a) Low youth unemployment; b) Smooth school-to-
work transitions; c) High degree of social integration; d) High degree of protection for 
young people; e) Based on a long tradition. 
The disadvantages are: a) Difficult to export, as shown by the experience of the Eastern 
länders, where the dual system is much less effective; b) The few who drop out have big 
problems to integrate. They are the bulk of unemployment for the rest of their lives; c) Too 
many are excluded by university education; d) Low social mobility; e) Very costly for 
schools, firms and young people. There is also some evidence that the employment 
opportunities offered to several young teenagers through the dual system vanish when they 
become young adults. 
 
4.3. The Anglo-Saxon system: High quality of education and labour market flexibility 
In the UK, the youth unemployment rate is relatively low at slightly more than 10%, but 
the youth-to-adult unemployment rate is one of the highest among OECD countries, at 
almost 3.5 (Quintini, Martin and Martin, 2007). Again this is the consequence of the very 
low average unemployment rate.  
Ireland is a bit of an exception in as much as youth unemployment used to be very high 
in the past, also as a consequence of low economic growth. In the last two decades, 
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success has been also the ability of young people to invest in tertiary education, coupled 
with high foreign direct investment in high tech industries (). As a consequence, the youth 
unemployment rate and the youth employment ratio are in the country among the lowest 
compared to the OECD average (Quintini, Martin and Martin, 2007). 
The educational system is flexible and sequential. There is a high degree of labour 
market flexibility, but fewer temporary jobs compared to continental Europe. This is most 
probably due to the fact that firing costs are generally low in these countries for any kind of 
labour contract and therefore, there is little need to sign fixed-term contracts.  
Unionisation used to be very high in the past, but it is dramatically shrinking from the 
1980s, while there is a relatively high degree of decentralised wage bargaining. Job search 
happens often through private employment agencies. Apprenticeship is available on a small 
scale. Passive income support is available for the weakest groups, provided that they attend 
pro-active schemes. Already from the 1980s, the length of unemployment benefits and the 
possibility of renewal after an employment spell has dramatically reduced to prevent the 
phenomenon of young people living on the dole for the rest of their lives. 
The bulk of unemployment in the Anglo-Saxon system is constituted of people with a 
particularly poor family background. Otherwise youth unemployment is a temporary 
phenomenon and the market bears the responsibility to facilitate the passage to adulthood. 
The advantages of this system are: a) Low youth unemployment rate, but still high if 
compared with that of the adults; b) Low share of temporary jobs; c) High level and quality 
of education; d) High social mobility; e) High degree of social integration; f) Based on a 
long tradition. 
The disadvantages of this system are: a) A bulk of long-term unemployed for those who 
drop out early from the educational system; b) Low degree of protection for young people; 
c) Extreme segmentation of the youth labour market; d) Very costly for individuals and 
households. 
 
4.4. The South European System: The family and … temporary work 
Apart from Poland and the Slovak Republic, countries where the unemployment rate is 
high also due to the dramatic process of transition, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain score the highest youth unemployment rate in Europe. Italy has also one of the 
highest youth to adult unemployment ratio, due perhaps to the fact that the average 
unemployment is shrinking in recent years, though more for the adults. The very high 
average unemployment rate of the countries in the area explains why they maintain a 
relatively low youth to adult unemployment rate.  
In recent years, the youth unemployment rate has slightly reduced, but at the cost of a 
dramatic explosion of temporary, often precarious or dead-end jobs. This is particularly the 
case of Spain, but is common also to France and Italy. 
The educational system is generally rigid and sequential. A typical feature of the Italian 
system is the tendency to make very easy access to tertiary education, which is open to all 
those with secondary high school, but very hard to complete the curriculum, due to the 
high indirect cost of studying for a big number of years. It takes usually more than 7 years 
to obtain a university degree. The introduction of elements of duality and the introduction 
of a 3+2 educational system have been not much more than a failure. 
The degree of labour market flexibility is according to many scholars still low, but it is 
dramatically increasing especially for the young people, due to the tendency to attain 
greater labour market flexibility through fixed-term contracts. These last reduce the hiring 
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generally high, though slightly decreasing in recent years.  
Informal networks of family and friends are the main method of job search for young 
people, which proves to be a rumour rather than a channel to reduce informational 
asymmetries between employers and employees, as proven by the wage penalty experienced 
by those using this job search method to find a job (Pistaferri, 1999; Mosca and Pastore, 
2007). Apprenticeship programmes were forbidden until recently. The expenditure in 
ALMP is insufficient and also the institutional context for its implementation is poor. 
Passive income support from the State regards only dismissed and, therefore, adult 
workers, while households support the rest of the risk of youth unemployment.  
The identikit of youth unemployment in Spain is as follows. Youth unemployed are: a) 
New entrants (34.6 months; 56 months for permanent job); b) Women, especially with 
children; c) And low education attainment; d) Trapped in precarious temporary 
employment; e) That causes frequent unemployment spells; f) Poor family background; g) 
Positive note? Unemployment shows negative duration dependence, but this is due to the 
high share of temporary work (Caroleo and Pastore, 2003). In the case of Italy, the identikit 
of youth unemployment is not much different. ALMP has no impact, not even the gross 
impact. Interestingly, Caroleo and Pastore (2005) find evidence of what they call a “training 
trap”: participation into training programmes does not affect employment chances, but 
only the probability to participate into other training programmes. 
The gender dimension is also a peculiarity of youth unemployment in this group of 
countries. While in other Northern European countries, men have long had lower 
educational levels and lower job opportunities compared to their female counterparts, in 
Southern European countries, women are increasing their educational level only recently 
and still young women represent the bulk of unemployment. This is due to different 
attitudes on gender roles, which require that women should be involved in reproduction 
activities only. In turn, this traditional view is ever more in contrast with the legitimate 
career ambitions of women and, coupled with little support by the state in favour of 
conciliation strategies, is causing increasing divorce rate and female age at first birth and, 
hence, decreasing fertility.  
The advantages of this model are: a) Low cost of access to the University; b) 
Introduction of flexibility and duality in the educational system; c) Move to the 3+2 
university system (Lisbon strategy); d) Increasing labour market flexibility; e) Increasing 
awareness of the youth unemployment problem; f) Households are good support for 
young people. 
The disadvantages are: a) Very long school-to-work transitions; b) Very high youth 
unemployment rate; c) Low education attainment; d) Low quality of education; e) Failure 
of the educational reform; f) Increasing job precariousness; g) Lowest social mobility; h) 
High costs for households; 
 
4.5. The new member states: Building a modern welfare system 
Due to the on-going reforms, it is still not clear whether the New Member States are a 
different group or whether they are better understood as parts of the above groups. In fact, 
the countries belonging to this group are heterogeneous, but share a common heritage. 
Consequently, also the outcomes in terms of youth unemployment are similar.  
The labour market position of young people in the new member states is on average 
worse than the EU average and close to that in Southern European countries (O’Higgins, 
2005). The ratio of the adult to youth unemployment rate fluctuates between 2 and 3 from 
one country to the other. Beleva et. al. (2001) find a ration of 2.1 for Bulgaria, whereas 
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Poland. However, almost everywhere the youth unemployment rate is high and large 
anecdotal evidence suggest that while few particularly skilled young people have been the 
real winners of transition, most low skill young people have been the losers. 
During the socialist system, in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), 
workers were used to a pervasive welfare state. Unemployment was virtually non-existent 
due to the commitment of socialist regimes to full employment as a way to exploit the 
entire labour surplus available (Kornai, 1992), but this implied also the commitment of 
state firms to provide jobs for all, though at very low wages. Moreover, the state used to 
provide also several other benefits to the most in need as well as free social services for all, 
including childcare facilities, health care, hospices and other services for the elderly. This 
was possible thanks to very soft budget constraints for state firms, the hidden state budget 
deficit and strong trade unions. 
When transition began (youth) unemployment started to emerge as a new reality and 
with it a debate started on the need to introduce some kind of employment protection 
legislation, state subsidies to the unemployed, early retirement schemes and support to 
inactive people. This type of new welfare state started under the auspices of the early 
Optimal Speed of Transition models (Aghion and Blanchard, 1994), which suggested that 
passive income support schemes might be useful to buy out workers from state owned 
enterprises and win their resistance to the reform process. At that time, the emphasis on 
rapid restructuring versus gradualism was dramatically affected by the fear of a return to 
the past and the need to make the transition process irreversible. This way of thinking 
found an encouraging consensus in the population as well as in all political parties worried 
to make the increasing unemployment, inequality and poverty socially acceptable. Also a 
widespread feeling was that the state, not the households should bear the social cost of 
reforms. The almost immediate consequence was the explosion of the social public 
expenditure, the pressure on the pension system, the dramatic increase of the dependency 
ratio, all factors that led the CEECs state budget to the edge of a dramatic collapse. 
Only in the late 1990s, when transition seemed to have become irreversible and state 
budget were suffering dramatic imbalances, the debate has shifted from the 
gradualism/shock therapy debate to a debate on the optimal design of labour market 
institutions. Two streams of literature have emerged that this research aims to discuss 
theoretically and test empirically. Some scholars (Boeri, 2000) started to point to passive 
schemes as the origin not only of threat for the financial and monetary stability, but also as 
a source of social distress for the actual way of working of the labour market and, 
consequently, for the speeding up of a transition process which seemed to experience a 
dramatic slow down. Boeri (2000) claimed that the right sequence for the implementation 
of non-employment benefits would have been the opposite of that actually followed: the 
governments should have started from low passive income support schemes to facilitate 
the flow from the state sector to non-employment and back to employment in the private 
sector. Only at a later stage, when unemployment was really involuntary, the governments 
should have started to provide income support to the losers of transition, namely those 
who were actually not employable in the private sector.  
Other scholars (Micklewright and Nagy, 1999; 2002) advocated that the sequence of 
reforms was the right one and that income support schemes in the early stages of transition 
were indeed necessary to help people bear the consequences of dramatic structural and 
cultural change. Moreover, in the early stages of transition, unemployment was essentially 
probably involuntary, whereas later when long-term unemployment started to emerge, 
unemployment benefits should have been reduced to increase incentives to work for non-
  11employed people. Finally, unemployment benefits have been very low in CEECs also 
compared to the low average wages and their bite would be minor.  
Also in new member states, youth unemployment is worrisome, among other reasons, 
because it contributes to make harder a dilemma that the young people in CEE have to 
face between continuing to invest in their own education, therefore reducing the 
household’s budget, on the one hand; and accessing immediately the labour market, 
therefore contributing to the household income, but reducing their own chance to find 
gainful employment in the future, on the other hand.  
As noted in Pastore (2005), the case of Poland is typical of the changes new member 
states are currently facing. Poland is the transition economy experiencing the highest 
degree of structural change and the highest unemployment rate in the area. It adopted a Big 
Bang approach to the reform process, by introducing simultaneously price and trade 
liberalisation, together with privatisation and macroeconomic stabilisation already in the 
early 1990s. A massive flow of foreign direct investment has triggered the process of 
technological change, on the one hand, and generated the need for skill upgrading of the 
workforce, especially of the youngest segments, on the other hand.  
Over the years, similar to other transition countries, the share of individuals with high 
education attainment has dramatically increased in Poland and other new member states, 
together with the progressive abatement of the share of people with vocational secondary 
degrees (Boeri, 2000). Domadenik and Pastore (2006, Tab. 5 and A5) find that from 1997 
to 2002 the percentage of young teenagers (15-19) in education increased from about 84 to 
88, while that of young adults (20-24) increased from 20 to 31. The corresponding figures 
for the early 1990s were 45 and 13 percent respectively. In both cases, Poland seems to be 
close to the educational targets fixed within the Lisbon strategy for the year 2010.  
However, these figures raise an important issue, namely what is the reason of the 
striking contrast between the excellent (at least quantitative) achievement in educational 
attainment and the delay in increasing youth employment and reducing youth 
unemployment rates, which remain well below the Lisbon objectives.  
In recent years, almost all new member states have implemented the 3+2 educational 
reform, while their ratio of expenditure in pro-active versus passive schemes has 
dramatically increased. The labour market is becoming increasingly flexible, though it 
remains, according to some observers, still more rigid than the already rigid Europe. 
The positive sides of the welfare systems in new member states include: a) The desire of 
young people to improve their economic condition; b) Deep reforms aimed to modernise 
the educational and training system; c) The existence of several forms of protection for 
young people by the State and also by international organisations, including the EU; d) The 
old tradition of high investment in human capital formation.  
The disadvantages include: a) a mismatch between the composition of supply of and 
demand for skills, which the educational system partly contributes to maintain; b) an 
excessive trust in the virtues of market forces; c) the low average income of household and 
high state deficit; d) the need to cope with increasing external constraints due also to EU 
accession; e) a massive process of brain drain. 
 
5. Discussion 
Based only on observation of the youth unemployment rate and ratio of youth to adult 
unemployment rate (Quintini, Martin and Martin, 2007, Figure 1), four types of countries 
can be detected when looking at labour market outcomes in a comparative perspective: 
a)  High youth unemployment rate and high youth to adult unemployment rate (Italy, 
France, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Czech Republic); 
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Iceland, Luxembourg; USA, Norway, New Zeland, Australia); 
c)  High youth unemployment rate and low youth to adult unemployment rate (Poland, 
the Slovak Republic, Spain, Portugal); 
d)  Low youth unemployment rate and low youth to adult unemployment rate 
(Germany, Denmark, Japan, Ireland, Austria, Netherlands, Switzerland). 
Interestingly, the classification adopted here based on statistical evidence almost 
overlaps with the previous classification based on educational and welfare systems. In other 
words, countries in the South European and the North-European system mainly belong to 
the group a) above. Spain and Portugal are the exception: here while the youth-to-adult 
unemployment rate is high, the youth unemployment rate is relatively low. The explanation 
for that is to be found in the high share of fixed-term contracts for young people and the 
fact that, therefore, the youth unemployment rate is reducing at a relatively quick rate 
compared to the adult unemployment rate in Spain
1. 
Anglo-Saxon countries, also outside the EU belong to the category b) above. This is 
because the average unemployment rate is low in these countries and even a low youth 
unemployment rate causes a high youth-to-adult ratio. 
New member states mainly belong to the group c), where the youth-to-adult ratio 
depends on the very high average unemployment rate. 
Finally, Continental European countries belong to group c), confirming the role that the 




This study has attempted to provide a theoretical framework to think of the youth 
unemployment problem. The main conclusion is that youth unemployment depends on the 
hardship young people find in filling the youth experience gap. In a mainstream approach 
to the issue, it is typical to think that a flexible labour market is the best solution to the 
youth experience gap. Through sizeable moves across different labour market statuses, 
young people achieve the human capital they need to become adult and productive, making 
it convenient for employers to hire them. Therefore, within this framework, labour market 
flexibility and low entry wages are the best solution to the youth experience gap. 
Two main argument cast doubts on the mainstream approach. First, it comes the 
Heckman, Borjas and Singer argument that there is no duration dependence from 
unemployment when controlling for omitted skill heterogeneity. The policy consequence is 
that training programmes are more efficient to reduce youth unemployment than increasing 
labour market flexibility. Becker’s work provides a second important argument: he suggests 
that fixed-term contract generate sufficient incentive to invest only in the formation of 
generic, but not of job specific work experience. There is therefore a failure in the market 
for job tenure, which should be addressed providing some incentives or specific training 
programmes. 
These arguments explain why labour market flexibility is only one of the policy 
instruments adopted in any country to help young people to fill the youth experience gap. 
They also let us understand why increasing entry flexibility in traditionally rigid EU 
countries has reduced youth unemployment only marginally, while generating much work 
                                                 
1 When the average unemployment rate is reducing the youth to adult ratio is reducing more quickly, 
because it is especially the youth component of unemployment to shrink. 
  13precariousness. Other not less important instruments to fight youth unemployment include 
the educational and training system, passive income support schemes and so on.  
It is certainly difficult to find recipes that accord to the institutional framework of any 
country and it is clear that in each group of countries there are bad and good performers. 
However, comparison of the outcomes of different European models of addressing the 
problem of school-to-work transition suggests that youth unemployment is lower: 
a.  With flexible, dual educational systems, which are also more inclusive; 
b.  Where labour market flexibility is coupled with high education attainment; 
c.  Where ALMP are fine tuned to the needs of the weakest groups: targeting and 
evaluation are necessary; 
d.  If households do not bear all the cost of youth unemployment. 
The Lisbon strategy defined by the Special EU Council of March 2000 suggests the 
importance for young people of investing in human capital accumulation for the future of 
Europe as “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion”. The analysis carried out in this paper suggests that the Lisbon strategy is a good 
guide for EU governments to fight youth unemployment. Nonetheless, it also suggests that 
the Lisbon strategy is difficult to implement due to important institutional and historical 
differences, and also very costly to implement especially for countries were youth 
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